Prior to undertaking our on the ground experimental research, we used existing observational data in order to explore the systematic variation in inter-group attitudes across cities in Israel. We relied on the Guttman-Avichai survey from 2009, which focuses on beliefs, values and social tensions within the Israeli-Jewish population. Respondents were presented with the following question: "In your opinion, how good are the relations between the religious and nonreligious?", and asked to choose from four possible answers: "very good," "fairly good," "not so good," and "not good at all." 1 With 2,192 observations taken from 41 towns in Israel, the observational data supported our initial intuitions. We display these results in Table A .1. As expected, a more uneven distribution of the Jewish population corresponds with worse perceptions of relations between the two groups. This holds true for both the UO and STR respondents. When the UO population is a minority in a mostly STR city, as is usually the case in mixed cities, the interaction of diversity and segregation leads to more negative perceptions of relations between religious and non-religious Jews.
A.3 Measurement of the UO Population
Our primary tests look at behavioral differences as a function of size and segregation of UO and STR populations. In order to assess the number of UO, the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) uses a variety of measurements. This measurement challenge reflects a deeper problem of classification. The definition of being part of the UO is mostly subjective and its meaning may change over time and place or across individuals. Furthermore, the UO are far from a cohesive social group. There are multiple religious strands within the UO community. In addition, the intra-Jewish ethnic cleavage between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi UO has remained especially salient among the UO over the years, and has been a continuous source of tension within this group. The CBS deals with these challenges by providing different measurements for the UO population, among them the percent of voters casting ballots for parties known to be supported by UO voters and the percent of male youth enrolled in schools for learning traditional Jewish religious texts (Yeshivas, which are attended almost exclusively by Ultra Orthodox). We also obtained city-level measures of UO population based on expert assessments by Israeli academics (Cahaner 2009 ). All three of these measures are highly correlated and yield similar results in our analysis. We report our findings based on segregation and group size constructed from the percent of youth in Yeshivas because we believe it is a more reliable measure than voting percentages.
There is no comparable measurement for the share of non-UO religious or traditional residents by municipality in the census. We are therefore unable to generate an index of out-group proportion or segregation for the non-UO religious respondents.
A.4 Measurement of Segregation
Dissimilarity measures the evenness with which two groups are distributed across the component areal units that make up a larger areal unit. In our case these are Statistical Areas (SA's) within cities or quarters of Jerusalem. The formula is
where u i = the population of UO in an SA. U = the total UO population in cities or quarters of Jerusalem. s i = the population STR in an SA. S = the total STR population in cities or quarters of Jerusalem.
The score can be interpreted as the percentage of one of the two groups (usually the minority) that would have to move to different geographic areas in order to produce a distribution in each smaller area that matches that of the larger area.
To construct the dissimilarity index, we aggregate SA's to the city or quarter level. SA's are the smallest unit of analysis used by the CBS (roughly equivalent to a Census Tract in the United States). In large cities, this unit stands for a small neighborhood, yet in rural parts of the country a statistical area may include the whole town. In most cases, SA's include around 1,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, though some of them are significantly smaller.
A.5 Participation Guidelines and Examples of Instruments
This section provides examples for the design of our instrument and the compensation received by participants in the study.
No deception was used in this study. The identity of all opposing players were genuine and these opposing players and respondents were actually paid according to the manner communicated to respondents before the games were played. Respondents were instructed that the amount of money they and the opposing players were to receive depended on their choices in the games and that they would receive the money they earned in one round of one of the games, to be randomly selected. As a result of this randomization, the game for which payment was given varied across participants. They were also promised a minimum compensation of 20 NIS (about $5; compared to a minimum hourly wage of about $5.7). If the randomly selected outcome was less than 20 NIS, they were paid this minimum. The mean payment was 42.6 NIS and the median was 40 NIS. The outcome used for payment was selected by the computer and the subject was paid immediately by the field worker. The average gross pay per hour in 2013 was around 52 NIS (note that participation took on average around 40 minutes).
The opposing players were recruited in advance, and their responses for the public good games were recorded by our fieldworkers prior to the experiment. As mentioned in our article, this paradigm has been used successfully in prior research, such as Whitt & Wilson (2007) . Opposing players were told that their compensation would depend on the decisions of participants in our experiment but were guaranteed a minimum of 100 NIS (all the opposing players received their payment only after fieldwork for the experiment was concluded).
In the example instruments below, the faces are blurred to protect the privacy of those who participated as opposing players. In our actual experiments, respondents were shown the original, unblurred pictures of these players.
Figure A.1: Dictator Game (Other Regarding Bias)
Note that in actual experiment, the face of the opposing players were not blurred.
Figure A.2: Public Goods Game (Strategy Selection Bias)
Figure A.3: Task Efficacy Question (Efficacy Bias)
Note that in actual experiment, the face of the opposing players were not blurred. Play of all UO and STR in public goods game with option of cooperating and contribution 20 NIS or defecting and keeping 20 NIS. Play of UO and STR in public goods game with option of cooperating and contribution 20 NIS or defecting and keeping 20 NIS. This table is only "sometimes cooperators." Sometimes cooperators are players that opted to cooperate with somebody, so players that never cooperated, regardless of the opposing player, are dropped.
A.6 Distribution of Responses to Public Goods Game

A.7 Full Results from Tests of Contextual Influences on Behavioral Strategies
Tables in this section are the full results from the regression of behavioral strategies on contextual variables, reported in Table 2 of the main article. 
A.8 Subsetting for Selection
In open ended questions, we asked respondents whether, when, and why they have moved into a new address. Respondents were asked whether they had been living in the same address for their whole life; those who answered negatively, were asked a series of questions about the circumstances of moving and choosing a new place to live. When asked "What was a factor in your decision to move to another place?", most respondents mentioned the size of their house and family changes (getting married or divorced), as well as the cost of living and educational options for their children. Only 30 respondents (less than 7%) mentioned the people around them. Those respondents who mentioned multiple reasons to leave were asked to choose the most important reason. Only four of these signaled "people" as the most important reason for moving. When asked what was it about the people around them that pushed them to move, only 12 respondents mentioned degree of religiosity.
While not many respondents opted out of a location because the people around them were seen as too religious, many UO did opt in to locations based on the perceived religiosity of the neighborhood. When asked about the factors that made them choose the city and neighborhood to which they moved, around 20% of the respondents mentioned "the people who live there." When asked what was it about the people around them which they most care about, the most common answer was "their degree of religiosity." So, by our survey measures, some individuals are explicitly choosing their location based on the presence of the outgroup. Figure A .5 is an example of the "design your neighborhood" task. Subjects were allowed to hypothetically choose their own neighbors, while keeping everything else about their neighborhood constant. The instructions in Figure A .5 (a) are:
Many people are pleased with where they live. But were you to to move into a new place, imagine you would buy a house you like and that you can afford. We want to know in which neighborhood you would have liked to buy your house. Which people would you have liked to live in the area? Imagine that your house is not affected by the people who live next to you. Look at the neighborhood below, and imagine you are buying the house in the middle of the neighborhood. Next to you there are 10 empty houses. Click on the box next to each house in order to choose which family will reside in it. Please choose residents for each of the 10 houses in the neighborhood. Example of the "design your neighborhood" task used as a direct measure of neighborhood preference. (a) is the task with a blank neighborhood. (b) shows the interactive task as the neighborhood begins to change. Regression of Other-Regarding Bias for UO on contextual and individual-level variables. Other-Regarding Bias is measured by the Dictator Game as the amount in NIS contributed to ingroup members minus the amount contributed to outgroup members. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Columns represent the following subsets of subjects: 1) people that do not report preferring to live exclusively with the ingroup, if they had the choice,
2) people that are not satisfied with where they live, 3) people that do not feel that they are free to move if they wanted to, 4) low income people, 5) people who do not list religious people as a reason affecting their choice of city of residence, 6) people who do not list religious people as a reason affecting their choice of neighborhood of residence, 7) people who did not relocate to an area with less of the outgroup, 8) people that did not design a homogeneous ideal neighborhood. * indicates significance at p < 0.05. (2009)). 
A.10 Full Results from Tests of Contextual Influences on Behavioral Strategies With Iterated Exclusion of Localities
In this section we report results testing for the the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of any single locality by iteratively re-estimating the models reported in Table 2 in the article with a locality excluded in each iteration. Regression of Strategy Selection Bias (Columns 1 and 2), Other-Regarding Bias (Columns 3 and 4), and Efficacy Bias (Columns 5 and 6) for UO (Columns 1, 3, and 5) and STR (Columns 2, 4, and 6) on contextual-level variables with the following control variables: gender, age, ethnicity, political ideology, income, immigrant to Israel, the percent Arab at the city level, and whether the player lives in Jerusalem. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Arad excluded. * indicates significance at p < 0.05 Strategy selection bias in the public goods games is decision to cooperate with ingroup member and not outgroup member in the public goods game (0-1 range). Other-Regarding Bias is the amount in NIS contributed to ingroup members minus the amount contributed to outgroup members (0-20 range). Efficacy bias is the tendency to choose the ingroup member over the outgroup member in the Lego task (0-1 range). Higher numbers represent greater bias against the outgroup. 
